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Abstract
The Israeli High-Tech industry boom in the past decade deserves a thorough study of the local reality as
well as an appraisal of the efficiency of existing programs. This paper sets as its main objective an
analysis of the effectiveness of the Incubator Program in Israel at the national, regional and local
economy level. First, we evaluate the High-Tech incubators as a filter of new technological ideas that
subsequently become new technology-based companies. Second, we identify the kind of investors who
are willing to participate in funding a project during and after the incubation period. Finally, we analyze
the geographical dispersal of the incubators and their contribution to local economic development. Our
general conclusion is that although technological incubators constitute an efficient program at both the
national and the local level, their wide geographical dispersal negatively effects their performance,
since it contrasts with the general tendency of High-Tech industries to agglomerate. It is our belief that
the total number of incubators should be reduced, their size enlarged and their locations more precisely
determined.
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Introduction
The development of a High-Tech industry and the rate of innovation adoption has often been linked to
economic growth [Kuznets, 1971]. Although a general framework for technological entrepreneurship as
a means of economic growth and industrial renewal was developed by Schumpeter back in the 1930’s
[Schumpeter 1934, 1939], it was only in the 1980’s that interest was renewed in this area. The rationale
for public support for the High-Tech industry is based on two suppositions: The first claims that High-
Tech industry is a desirable activity for the economy of any country (or for its households) in that it
gives a high added value, has many positive externalities that influence other branches of the economy
[Plaut and Bental, 1984], and is strongly export-oriented (particularly important to small economies)
[JIM, et. al., 1987]. Moreover, High-Tech industry appears to be one of the few branches of the
economy that remains employment-creating, relatively unaffected by automation. The second describes
the different market failures associated with the High-Tech industry, such as the difficulties of
enforcing intellectual rights and therefore retaining the positive effects of new discoveries [Plaut and
Bental, 1984], and the need for a critical mass of knowledge and funds in specific areas.
Recently, particular attention has been given to new technology-based firms [Moore and Garsney,
1993; Roberts, 1991; Reynolds, 1987; National Science Foundation, 1981]. In an evolutionary
perspective, small new firms provide the pool of young firms from which the big industries of the future
will emerge [Reynolds, 1987]. They have proved to be much more flexible and adaptable to new
technologies than big firms, thereby helping innovation to reach the market faster [Garsney et. al.,
1994].
The spatial distribution of High-Tech industry has been the focus of many studies. Agglomeration of
such industries as found in Silicon Valley (California) [Saxenian, 1983] or CambsTec (Cambridge,
England) [Segal and Quince, 1985] appears to be the most common distribution pattern, although
lately, some studies reported a dispersal trend [Keeble, 1994]. Among the factors associated with the
location of High-Tech entrepreneurships, the most common are the need for highly skilled manpower,
proximity to a university or a technological institution and the availability of venture capital.
In spite of its trend to agglomerate, High-Tech industry is also very attractive as a means for local
economic development for a number of reasons [Bar-El and Shefer, 1989; Malecki, 1984], including3
the fact that they generally cause much less pollution than traditional industry. As sensitivity to
environmental impacts grows and monetary sanctions against polluting industries are becoming popular
almost everywhere, this appears to be a major advantage. Furthermore, High-Tech industries are only
minimally affected by transportation costs as the price/weight ratio of its products are relatively high,
which implies that at least in this respect, peripheral regions are still suitable for the location of High-
Tech industries. Finally, positive effects that hold at a national level such as high “added value” and
positive externalities hold at the regional and local level as well.
A wide variety of tools have been developed in different countries and regions in order to give
incentive to the High-Tech industry. These can be roughly divided into four categories, each focusing
on a different aspect of new-firm development: Fiscal tools, direct financing tools, consulting tools and
infrastructure-oriented tools. The technological incubator is an integrative program that provides
several different services according to its definition and sponsor. Popular services include the funneling
of public and private venture capital to projects, business and marketing consultation, and the provision
of low-cost rent and infrastructure. At a national level, the incubators program can be seen as a tool for
filtering and developing valuable and original ideas and for providing seed-capital. At a local level the
incubator can be seen as a means for local economic development in that it creates a nucleus of small
new developing firms in a specific location. It is important to point out that the technological incubator
is an economic development program “from below” [Stohr and Taylor, 1981] aimed at fostering
technological entrepreneurs from the very beginning of their project’s development. Therefore, the
incubator has advantages and drawbacks typical of this kind of program. On the one hand, it can help to
create a healthy entrepreneurial culture by empowering local people and encouraging them to develop
their own firms locally. On the other hand, it works very slowly. In order to assess the actual impact of
the program on employment and economic development, at least 15-20 years are needed. The
technological incubator located in a remote region supplies a number of functions that are seldom found
in peripheral areas, including venture capital supply, business and legal consulting, and the filtering of
valuable ideas. However, it obviously cannot help in increasing the supply of skilled manpower.
Research Context and Aim
In the early 1990’s the Israeli High-Tech industry has blossomed in an unprecedented way. The
electronics industry, for instance, which accounts for most of the High-Tech sector, increased its sales4
from $2 billion in 1986 to almost $6 billion in 1995 [Association of Electronics Industries, 1996].
Formal venture capital funds, almost non-existent until 1990, have totaled some $1 billion in 1996
[OCS, 1997]. The exceptional growth of Israeli civil High-Tech firms began in 1986 with the closure of
the “Lavi” project (the Israeli-designed fighter airplane) which caused a few thousand engineers to
leave the military industry for the civil sector and often to become technological entrepreneurs. The
boom has been boosted by the massive immigration of highly skilled workers form the former Soviet
Union in the early 1990’s.
A crucial role in Israel’s High-Tech growth is played by start-ups. According to the Office of the Chief
Scientist (which operates the Israeli R&D public-sector incentives programs), Israel produces the
highest absolute number of technological start-up companies per year in the world after the U.S. [OCS,
1997]. While start-up capital is usually provided by venture capital funds, seed capital is often supplied
by technological incubators.
Between 1990 and 1993, 28 incubators were established throughout the country, with 26 of them still
operating (see Map 1). Each incubator is granted $184,000 per year and projects $154,000 per year for
a maximum of two years and up to 85% of the approved budget [Ministry of Industry and Trade, 1995].
An additional 15%, the “complementary financing”, is to be supplied by the entrepreneur himself or by
a partner in exchange for an equity in the project.
The first objective of our study was to describe technological incubator operation as a filter of new and
valuable ideas in the framework of the new Israeli reality. This was done by means of two basic
indicators. First, we describe the filtering of ideas as it happens in the “typical incubator” by means of
the number of projects surviving at the different stages of the incubation process. Secondly, we examine
the investors that took part in the funding of the projects during and after the incubation period.5
Map 1: Spatial Distribution of 26 Technological Incubators in Israel.6
The spatial distribution of the incubators as shown on Map 1 reflects the will of the Israeli authorities to
use incubators as a tool for promoting local economic development regardless of the disadvantages
associated with locating the incubators in peripheral areas. Our last objective is to examine the
differences between peripherally and centrally located incubators by means of a few selected indicators,
thereby assessing the efficiency of incubators as a means of local economic development.
Three basic questions make up the assessment: 1. Is the success rate among projects managed in
metropolitan incubators any different than the success rate of projects managed in peripheral
incubators? 2. How does the relocation pattern of successful projects relate to their original location? 3.
What characterizes the investors of projects in different incubator locations?
Data Source
The data employed in this study were collected by means of a questionnaire. The managers of 17 out of
27 incubators agreed to answer our questionnaire and to be personally interviewed. The data cover
some 339 projects that were managed by the incubators until September 1996 and 107 of these that
have succeeded in finding partners or selling their products after the incubation period. For the purpose
of comparison, incubators were divided into peripheral (7 incubators) and metropolitan (6 incubators)
categories. Data relating to the remaining 4 incubators are included only in calculations averaging all
incubators (see Map 2).
Results of the Analysis
The manpower education is a common indicator for High-Tech firms. Figure 1 shows the education
level of the incubators’ program entrepreneurs and it is pretty impressive: almost 100% of the
entrepreneurs have academic education, 24% of them obtained a M.Sc. degree and as many as 63% of
them hold a Ph.D. degree. It should be mentioned that other workers are employed in the projects apart
from the entrepreneurs; nonetheless, as firms at this stage are very small (up to 5-6 when leaving the
incubator), entrepreneurs make up for at least 20% of a firms’ total labor force. Assuming, as a worst
case, a project with 6 employees, of which only the entrepreneur holds a degree, the percentage of
skilled labor would still be 17%, while the average percentage of scientists, engineers and technicians in
Israeli industry is 14% [Ben-Aharon and Toren, 1993]. On these grounds we can safely define the
incubators’ projects as “High-Tech”.7










Figure 1: Entrepreneurs’ level of education.
Our next analysis deals with the performance of the incubator as a filter of new and valuable ideas.
Figure 2 shows the flow of ideas from the moment they are submitted to the incubators’ manager until
they leave the incubator. Several important conclusions can be drawn from this result:
1.  Most of the project selection process is carried out by the incubator’s manager and board and not
by the central committee of the incubators, although the latter takes the ultimate decision.
2.  About half (52.6%) of the projects that are accepted to the incubator succeed in continuing their
activity. We define as successful a project that has succeeded in raising funds from private sources
and/or in selling his products. By this definition we rule out projects that continue only by means of
the entrepreneur’s own savings and/or with public funds.
3.  Most of the projects that fail in continuing their activity, fail also at the stage of raising additional
funds and not at the stage of technological development that is required by the incubator after the
first year of the incubation program. Lavi-Steiner and Goldberg [1995] came to similar conclusions
and criticized the incubators’ management for giving too little attention to the marketing problems
upon acceptance of the new ideas.9
Number of proposals submitted: 505
Submitted to the incubator’s steering committee: 26
Were accepted in the incubator: 22
12                                                                   8
Left the incubator                                       Are still in the incubator
6      6
Succeeded in raising additional funds Closed
2 4
  Closed before the end Closed at the end
Figure 2: Number of projects surviving at various stages of gestation in a “typical incubator”.
Our second set of results is concerned with describing the investors who fund  projects in the incubators
during and after the incubation period – the “complementary financing”, and “subsequent financing”
stages, respectively. In this case the incubator can be seen as a means of driving public and private
funds to valuable projects. It is important to note, in this respect, that the cost of High-Tech projects’
appraisal and follow-up can be so high as to discourage private investors from putting money in them.
We can say that public funds supplied by means of the incubator considerably reduce the high
“transaction costs” connected with the first development stage of projects. In this way the projects are
prepared for private investments.
Figure 3 shows financing sources taking part in the projects that were accepted to the incubator
program while Figure 4 shows the sources investing at secondary stages. A few interesting observations
should be made:10
Figure 3: Sources of the “Complementary Financing” (n=275).
1.  The integrative financing originates mostly from the incubator itself or from its sponsor (usually a
big High-Tech company or holding). It should be mentioned that an attempt was made to
understand more deeply the relationships between the incubator and its sponsor through interviews
of the incubators’ managers. Nonetheless, probably because of the business sensitivity of this issue,
managers refused to give details on it.
2.  Venture capital funds investments are extremely rare participants in the integrative financing but
begin to be seen in the subsequent financing stage when projects are more mature. Based on the
results shown above, on interviews with venture capital funds managers, and on some general
literature [Bank of England, 1990], we can state that venture capital funds, among them Israeli
funds, do not like seed-money investments, i.e. participating in the very inception of a project’s
development. Then, we reason that only two kind of private investors have the possibility to
professionally filter valuable ideas and give them business consulting similar to the incubator:
Venture capital funds and big High-Tech companies. Nonetheless, the former are not ready to
invest at the same development stage and the latter are usually only willing to invest in their field
of industry. Therefore, it appears that technological incubators do add a new tool to the Israeli
“Innovation System” and that it does not have an alternative in the private sector.
3.  As far as the subsequent financing is concerned, the first notable result is that the chief scientist














foster new technology-based companies from the very beginning through the first steps of
development.
4.  Only 16 of the 107 “successful” projects succeeded in selling their products at this stage. This is
just another indication that projects at this stage are still in their infancy.
5.  A total of 191 investors were counted over 107 projects, indicating an average of 1.8 investors per
project.
Figure 4: Sources of financing after the incubation period (n=191).
The last stage of our research is concerned with the geographical dispersal of the incubators. A first
basic result is the comparison between the success percentages of metropolitan and peripheral
incubators. It should be mentioned that definitions of “success” vary widely in the literature [Reynolds
and Miller, 1992]. In our case a “successful project” is defined as one that has at least one source of
financing that is not public and that is not provided by the entrepreneur himself. In other words, a
source that invested in the project on the basis of business criteria alone.
Evidence shows that metropolitan incubators have a significantly higher success rate than their
counterparts in peripheral areas (see Fig. 5 and Map 2). One could advance many hypotheses on why
this happens, such as the greater availability of skilled manpower and venture capital, shorter distances
to business and law services, the presence of large companies working in the same field as the project
and various other factors more easily found in core as opposed to peripheral areas. Indeed, as we shall




















































leaving metropolitan incubators but are rarely found among projects leaving peripheral incubators.
Moreover, it should be mentioned that 5 of 6 metropolitan incubators enjoy the sponsorship of a
University, whereas no peripheral incubator has even indirect links to one.
It is important to note that while metropolitan incubators clearly outperform peripheral incubators, the
peripheral incubator’s performance is also quite impressive.
Figure 5: Success rate of “Metropolitan” vs. “Peripheral” incubators and of all incubators.
In order to examine the reasons that might explain the better performance of the metropolitan
incubators it was decided to check whether there is a difference between the number of potential ideas
submitted to incubators located in metropolitan regions compared to the number submitted to
incubators located in peripheral regions. The test was carried out by comparing the “incubator’s
manager’s choice”, i.e. the percentage of ideas approved as a part of all the proposals received by the
incubator. Metropolitan incubators accepted only 2.9% of the proposals submitted while peripheral
incubators accepted 4.6% of the proposals. In other words, metropolitan incubators’ managers have a



























Figure 6: Percentage of proposals accepted at “Metropolitan” vs. “Peripheral”
   incubators and the average for all incubators.
In order to assess the efficiency of peripheral incubators as a means of local development it was
necessary to examine the number of companies that were actually created each year in the same town
where the incubator is located. In other words, how many of the successful projects remained in the
same town where they completed their incubation period? Table 1 displays the present location of
successful projects as a function of their incubator’s location. Several important conclusions can be
drawn by examining this table:
1.  Regardless of the incubator’s location, many projects chose to locate within the incubator’s area
after the incubation period (see also Table 2). This suggests that the incubator can be seen as a
technological park growing by means of its own successful projects. At least two reasons can be
suggested for this phenomenon: a) The entrepreneur has become used to the services supplied by
the incubator and its staff. b) The entrepreneur is living near the incubator and is unwilling to
move.
2.  A fairly high percentage of the projects (65%) remain in the same city as the incubator (those who
remain in the incubator itself plus those who remain in the same city but outside the incubator
area). Although this percentage drops to 57% (see Table 2) for projects located in peripheral areas
it appears that still a large percentage of the projects continue their activity in their initial location
and thus contribute to the local industrial development.
3.  Among the projects that leave the incubator, it is more likely to find them in the same locality if
they originate at a metropolitan incubator (37%) than if they originate at a peripheral one (19%).
This result seems to add to the general claim that peripheral locations are not so favorable for
High-Tech firms as compared with metropolitan locations.14
4.  The northern peripheral region (Galilee) appears to be a more desirable location for successful
projects than the southern region (Negev). Among the projects that left their city of origin in the
north, 47% relocated in the same region, whereas none of the projects that left their city of origin in
the south relocated in the same region. Moreover, among the projects that left metropolitan
incubators, 16% relocated in a northern small city while none relocated in the southern region.
5.  There is no noticeable trend among peripheral projects to move to one of the Israeli metropolitan











































































































Table 1: Location of successful projects after the incubation period as a function of the incubator’s
location.






































Table 2.1: Results of the statistical analysis.15
Test Peripheral-south Peripheral-north t-test
















(*)  Significance at p < 0.05
(**)  Data of the number of proposals submitted to the incubators’ managers are based on their 
estimations, therefore these figures can bear some errors.
Table 2.2: Results of the statistical analysis.
Another interesting insight into the differences between Metropolitan and Peripheral incubators is
shown by the kind of investors that participate in the funding of the new projects both at the very
beginning (with the “integrative financing”) and at the end of the incubation period. Figure 7 shows the

























Figure 7: Sources of the “Integrative Financing” as a function of incubator location.
A few interesting results can be derived from the data:
1.  The “sponsor” of the incubator (i.e. a big company that invests systematically in the projects) is a
very frequent investor in metropolitan projects and a very rare investor in peripheral projects. This
merely reflects the fact that big companies are most often located in metropolitan areas rather than
in peripheral areas.16
2.  The incubator itself is a frequent investor in peripheral projects and a rare investor in metropolitan
projects.
3.  Entrepreneurs and private investors are more easily found in the periphery than in the core region
4.  Venture capital investment funds are practically absent at this stage of project development. This is
an important finding in that it supports the general idea that venture capital funds are reluctant to
invest seed-capital in the earliest stages of the projects’ gestation. Thus, technological incubators do
not compete with venture capital funds. On the contrary, technological incubators appear to provide
“additionality” to the national economy.
Together, we get the basic different patterns of investment in metropolitan and peripheral areas.
Figure 8 displays the types of investors that participate in the funding of projects after the incubation
period as a function of the incubator’s location. A few interesting issues can be noted:
Figure 8: Sources of financing after the incubation as a function of the incubator’s location.
1.  Venture capital funds are more easily found among investors in projects leaving metropolitan
incubators than among those projects leaving peripheral incubators. It appears that venture capital
funds can be simply accounted for as features of the core regions. However, it should also be










































and business centers are not so great as to rule out venture capital intervention. Factors other than
distance may play some role in this respect.
 
2.  Projects of metropolitan origin are more likely to partially support themselves than projects of
peripheral origin. This can be seen as just another indication of the better performance of the
metropolitan incubators as opposed to the peripheral incubators.
 
3.  The “strange” result showing that 3.7% of the projects leaving metropolitan incubators were
supported by the Law for the Encouragement of Investments (which generally targets peripheral
regions) is due to the fact that High-Tech projects in Jerusalem qualify under this law for support,
although Jerusalem is considered a “core” region in our research.
 
4.  It is interesting to note that private investors are more likely to participate both in the integrative
and subsequent funding of projects in the peripheral areas rather than in the metropolitan areas.
The incubator can be seen as a way of keeping funds in the same area.
Conclusions and Discussion
The fact that as many as 35% of the successful projects remain in the immediate vicinity of the
incubator is a very interesting and important finding. Even more interesting is the fact that there is no
significant difference in this ratio between metropolitan and peripheral incubators. This seems to lead
us to the conclusion that the incubator can be seen as a self-sustaining nucleus of young industries.
Secondly, we note that many “successful” projects tend to remain in their original location. We have to
remember that each incubator runs an average of only 8 projects (4 per year) and that, as we saw
previously, only about half of them succeed in continuing their activity after the incubation period. Of
the two annually successful projects, only one will remain in the vicinity of the incubator! In other
words: in spite of the impressive success rate of the incubator and its tendency to keep successful
projects nearby, its size is such that it produces only one small new High-Tech firm per year in its
location. In this way the small peripheral incubator fails to create the critical mass of firms that is
required in order to create a “High-Tech conglomerate”.
The basic mistake associated with attracting High-Technology firms to peripheral areas is that when
such enterprises begin to succeed, they need a large number of highly skilled workers that are not18
readily available in peripheral areas. This is not felt so critically at the very beginning of the activity
because, at that point, the entrepreneurs themselves still account for most of the needed know-how.
However, as the company grows, it needs increasing numbers of skilled workers and thus considers
moving to a large urban area. An interesting compromise between the core and the periphery approach
is provided by the “Technopolis” [Smilor et. al., 1989]. The “Technopolis” is a concept that was put
forward in Japan by the “MITI”, the Japanese institution for R&D promotion. In that country, a town is
eligible for large governmental contributions if it has a population of at least 100,000, good
transportation links to the financial and administrative centers of the country and some existing R&D
facilities. The Japanese program appears to be successful, at least at its onset, when as many as 26
towns throughout the country have applied for public assistance.
It is our belief that the “Technopolis” model could also be interesting to implement in Israel as a
compromise between the trend of the High-Tech industry to agglomerate in large metropolitan areas
and the will of the planning authorities to achieve population dispersal and the economic development
of peripheral regions. While only the southern town of Beer-Sheva has more than 100,000 inhabitants, a
few other clusters of smaller towns (Carmiel-Tefen, Yokneam, Nazereth and Migdal Haemek) in the
north of the country have the potential to develop into small “Technopolises”.
The implications of such an approach for the location of technological incubators would be that instead
of having 26 incubators throughout the country, each running some 6-12 projects, there would be about
10 incubators, each running 25-30 projects. These incubators would be located in the three major
Israeli metropolitan areas (Tel-Aviv, Haifa and Jerusalem) and in a few selected clusters of smaller
urban centers located in peripheral areas. Such a policy would, in our opinion, also lead to an increase
in the size of the incubator and of its permanent staff.19
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